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Abstract 
Characterizing system performance under disruption is a growing area of research, 
particularly for describing a system’s resilience to a disruption event. Within the 
framework of system resilience, this study approaches the minimization of a multiple-
commodity system’s vulnerability to multiple disruption events. The vulnerability of a 
system is defined by the degree to which commodities can no longer flow through the 
system to satisfy demand given a disruptive event. A multi-objective formulation is 
developed to find defense strategies at minimal cost that maintain a high level of 
demand satisfaction across all commodities. A solution method involving an estimation 
of the Pareto frontier via the Non-dominated Sorted Genetic Algorithm II (NSGA-II) is 
also proposed. A decision support environment is proposed and supported by 
application of the Technique for Order of Preference by Similarity to Ideal Solution 
(TOPSIS). The proposed formulation and solution method are illustrated with an 
example generated from the multi-commodity Swedish rail network. 
 
Keywords: vulnerability, resilience, multi-commodity network flow, max flow, rail 
transportation, multiple commodity 
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Chapter 1: Introduction and Motivation 
Characterizing the performance of critical infrastructure following a disruptive event is 
an increasingly important area of research, given (i) the frequency of possible 
disruptions, and (ii) the scale of their implications. The US government emphasizes 
resilience planning for critical infrastructures, suggesting that they “must be secure and 
able to withstand and rapidly recover from all hazards”[1]. The ability to withstand, to 
adapt to, and to recover from a disruption is generally referred to as resilience[2].  
 
A number of qualitative and quantitative approaches for characterizing resilience have 
been offered in the recent literature[3]. One such approach is depicted graphically in 
Figure 1[4]-[6]. This approach describes system performance before, during, and after a 
disruption with function 𝜑(𝑡). Note two dimensions of resilience in Figure 1. The lack 
of ability of the network to maintain performance immediately following disruptive 
event 𝑒𝑘 is referred to as its vulnerability, an area receiving attention in the network 
literature for several years[7],[8]. The ability of the network to return to an acceptable 
level of performance in a timely manner is referred to as its recoverability, a burgeoning 
area of study in the network field[9]-[11]. Moreover, recoverability has garnered attention 
earlier within specific fields of research (e.g., power system reliability[12]).  
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Figure 1. Illustration of network performance, 𝝋(𝒕), across different transition 
states. 
 
With this approach in mind, the evaluation and quantification of these resilience 
dimensions is possible in a way that is generalizable across many problem instances. 
Graph encoding and network formulation are often relied upon for applying 
optimization approaches to a particular system, and it is assumed that networks of 
interest in this study lend themselves to such modeling paradigms. In previous research, 
efforts to quantify network characteristics were directed towards graph-theoretic 
measures (e.g., edge betweenness, centrality). However, performance-driven measures 
may be of more use in the context of network resilience for decision making 
purposes[13],[14]. These metrics connect the idea of vulnerability with network flow as a 
proxy of system performance. As such, node and/or arc importance is a function of the 
degree to which overall network performance depends on the existence of, capacity of, 
and flow along that node/arc. This study focuses on the dimension of vulnerability—
specifically, the degree to which vulnerability (in terms of performance loss) can be 
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mitigated by employing an effective defense strategy against probable disruptions with 
known parameters. 
 
Given that a planner has some prior knowledge that a network faces a disruptive event 
with uncertainty, it is assumed that the planner will attempt to insulate, fortify, or 
otherwise harden the network in a way that minimizes the extent of the disruption 
(vulnerability reduction). Such a defense strategy would incur some cost to implement. 
The general approach for this study is to employ a defense strategy at a minimal cost 
that also minimizes network vulnerability. Prior effort has formalized this multi-
objective problem[15], taking into account discrete, diverse “attack” scenarios and 
offering a solution approach for approximating Pareto-optimality to define an overall 
robust defense strategy. This study makes use of this approach, extending it for multi-
commodity networks. The Pareto-optimal defense strategies are specific to a particular 
attack (hereafter more generally referred to as “disruption”). To explore strategies that 
are robust to multiple disruptions, the Pareto-optimal frontiers could be consolidated 
based on stakeholder opinions of the trade-offs between several criteria, including 
vulnerability reduction across several disruptions and cost. This study uses a 
multicriteria decision analysis technique, the Technique for Order of Preference by 
Similarity to Ideal Solution (TOPSIS), to address these trade-offs, especially given the 
possibility of a large, high-dimensional Pareto set to consider. 
The goal of this paper is to propose a methodology for making robust decisions for 
reducing vulnerability in multi-commodity networks under uncertain disruptions. The 
remainder of this paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed methodology. 
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Section 3 illustrates the methodology with a Swedish rail case study, and Section 4 
offers concluding remarks.  
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Chapter 2: Proposed Methodology 
This section discusses the proposed methodology for making robust decisions for 
reducing vulnerability in multi-commodity networks under uncertain disruptions. 
 
2.1. Single Commodity Formulation  
The network vulnerability reduction formulation proposed here extends that which was 
given previously for a single commodity[15], described as follows.  
 
Let a network be represented by 𝐺 = (𝑁, 𝐴), where 𝑁 represents the set of nodes (with 
source node 𝑠 and sink node 𝑡), and 𝐴 represents the set of links (or edges) between 
nodes. The capacity of link (𝑖, 𝑗) directed from node 𝑖 to node 𝑗 is 𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗), where 𝑎𝑖𝑗 is 
a binary indicator of disruption equal to 1 if the link is disrupted and 0 if the link is not 
disrupted. It is assumed that if link (𝑖, 𝑗) experiences a disruption, 𝑞𝑖𝑗(1) ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗(0). The 
set of (disrupted) capacities across all links is noted as the vector 𝐪. 
 
The original formulation considers a set of resources belonging to an adversary divided 
amongst disruptive events 𝐞𝑘 ∈ 𝐷, which further divide those resources so that 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘  
refers to the amount of resources dedicated to disrupt link (𝑖, 𝑗) for event 𝑘. The set of 
all disruptive events is 𝐷. 
The network defender is assumed to be aware of possible disruption scenarios, 𝐷, but 
not aware of the specific components and their locality. The defender employs defense 
strategy 𝐡𝑙 to minimize the vulnerability of the network to disruption 𝐞𝑘, where ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑙  
denotes the resources dedicated to mitigate damage to link (𝑖, 𝑗) for strategy 𝑙. 
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Linking disruption and defense strategies with the notion of vulnerability is a contest 
function found in Eq. (1) based on work by Skapderas[16] and supported by the 
competing resource strategy by Levitin and Hausken[17]. That is, given disruption 𝑘 and 
defense strategy 𝑙, the disruptive threat to link (𝑖, 𝑗) is the probability that the link’s 
capacity is reduced to zero, represented with 𝑢𝑖𝑗(𝐞
𝑘, 𝐡𝑙). The exponent 𝑚 describes 
contest intensity (which defaults to a value of 1). Note that this contest function is 
particularly used for attacker/defender scenarios, though it is considered more generally 
here for disruptions beyond only malevolent attacks where 𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘  could broadly be 
interpreted as the strength of disruption to link (𝑖, 𝑗) and where ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑙  could be a similarly 
scaled measure of the strength of defense of link (𝑖, 𝑗). 
 
𝑢𝑖𝑗(𝐞
𝑘, 𝐡𝑙) =
{
 
 (𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘)
𝑚
(𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘)
𝑚
+ (ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑙 )
𝑚 if (𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘)
𝑚
> 0
0  if (𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘 )
𝑚
= 0
 (1) 
 
When 𝐞𝑘 and 𝐡𝑙 are known, each link’s survival probability is assumed to be a random 
variable with probabilities given by Eq. (2).  
 
𝑃 (𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗)) = {
1 − 𝑢𝑖𝑗(𝐞
𝑘, 𝐡𝑙)   if 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 1
           0                 if 𝑎𝑖𝑗 = 0
 (2) 
 
Expected network performance, where 𝜑 is defined as source-to-sink flow, can be 
described as 𝜀(ℎ𝑙, 𝑒𝑘) = 𝐸[𝜑(𝐪)|𝐞𝑘, 𝐡𝑙]. And network performance is a function of link 
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flow, 𝑓(𝑞𝑖𝑗) ∈ (0, 𝑞𝑖𝑗(1)). From these definitions, the formulation is defined as 
follows. The objectives in Eqs. (3) and (4) are expected network performance and cost 
of vulnerability reduction, respectively. Constraint (5) is through-network flow balance, 
constraint (6) is terminal (source-sink) flow balance, constraint (7) enforces link 
capacity, and constraint (8) ensures non-negativity. These constraints are typical in the 
maximum flow literature[18]. Note that this formulation accounts for a single source and 
a single sink for each commodity, which could be imposed as “super source” and “super 
sink” nodes. 
 
 max
𝑙
𝜀(𝒉𝑙, 𝒆𝑘)  ∀ 𝐞𝑘 ∈ 𝐷 (3) 
 min
𝑙
𝐶(𝐡𝑙) (4) 
s.t. ∑𝑓(𝑞𝑖𝑗)
𝑖|ℎ𝑖𝑗
− ∑ 𝑓(𝑞𝑗𝑘)
𝑘|ℎ𝑗𝑘
= 0  ∀  𝑖, 𝑗 ∈ 𝑁, ∉ {𝑠, 𝑡} (5) 
 ∑ 𝑓(𝑞𝑠𝑗)
𝑗|ℎ𝑠𝑗
− ∑ 𝑓(𝑞𝑘𝑡)
𝑘|ℎ𝑘𝑡
= 0 ∀ 𝑗, 𝑘 ∈ 𝑁, ∉ {𝑠, 𝑡} (6) 
 𝑓(𝑖, 𝑗) ≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗) ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴 (7) 
 ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑙 ≥ 0 (8) 
 
The two objectives are in competition, so a Pareto-optimal set and relevant tradeoff 
schemes have to be determined for decision support.   
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2.2 Multi-commodity Extension 
This study extends the above formulation to include multiple commodities that do not 
share the same link capacity resource, where the set of commodities is 𝑉, (𝑣 ∈ 𝑉). The 
formulation assumes that a given commodity may have multiple points of supply and 
demand, so each commodity’s set of source and sink nodes is defined as 𝑆𝑣 and 𝑇𝑣, 
respectively. Demand for a commodity at a given node 𝑧 is noted as 𝑑𝑣𝑧 (where 
negative demand denotes supply). Flow of commodity 𝑣 across link (𝑖, 𝑗) is denoted by 
𝑓𝑣(𝑖, 𝑗).  
 
The new objective functions accounting for multiple commodities are found in Eqs. (9) 
and (10). Eq. (9) refers to the minimization of the largest fraction of unsatisfied demand 
across all commodities. Where a common measure of network performance (𝜑 from 
Figure 1) might be maximum flow for a pair of nodes (or all nodes [Nicholson et al. 
2016]) or the amount of demand being met in demand nodes, we consider the minimal 
greatest fraction of unsatisfied demand across commodities. This allows us to represent 
network performance with a vulnerability measure, which would likely increase after a 
disruption (as opposed to the decreasing phenomenon in Figure 1). It is assumed that 
each commodity has equal economic importance, though alternative importance 
schemes could easily be represented with convex-sum weighting schemes in Eq. (9). 
The second objective in Eq. (10) refers to the minimization of the cost of implementing 
strategy 𝑙, 𝐶(𝐡𝑙). The cost function is taken to be specific to the problem and is left in a 
general form here. 
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min
ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑙
𝑧1 = max
𝑣∈𝑉
(1 − ∑∑
𝑓𝑣(𝑠𝑣, 𝑗)
∑ 𝑑𝑣𝑧𝑧∈𝑁
𝑗∈𝑁𝑠𝑣∈𝑆
) (9) 
min
ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑙
𝑧2 = 𝐶(𝐡
𝑙) (10) 
  
The constraints for the single commodity formulation in Eqs. (3)-(8) are reformulated as 
Eqs. (11)-(14) to account for multiple commodities and the possibility of multiple 
sources and sinks for each commodity. Here, Eq. (11) refers to flow balance (amount in 
equals amount out, less the amount demanded at that node), Eq. (12) refers to 
commodity flow conservation (no commodity is lost in the network), Eq. (13) refers to 
the post-disruption capacity constraint on each link, and Eq. (14) refers to the non-
negativity condition of the defense strategy (no benefit can come from decreasing 
resources from a link). 
 
∑𝑓𝑣(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑖|ℎ𝑖𝑗
− ∑ 𝑓𝑣(𝑗, 𝑘)
𝑘|ℎ𝑗𝑘
− 𝑑𝑣𝑗 = 0 ∀ 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉,  𝑗 ∉ {𝑆𝑣 ∪ 𝑇𝑣} (11) 
∑ 𝑓𝑣(𝑠𝑣, 𝑗)
𝑗|ℎ𝑠𝑣𝑗
− ∑ 𝑓𝑣(𝑘, 𝑡𝑣)
𝑘|ℎ𝑘𝑡𝑣
= 0  ∀ 𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 (12) 
∑𝑓𝑣(𝑖, 𝑗)
𝑣∈𝑉
≤ 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑣(𝑎𝑖𝑗) ∀ (𝑖, 𝑗) ∈ 𝐴,  𝑣 ∈ 𝑉 (13) 
ℎ𝑖𝑗
𝑙 ≥ 0 (14) 
 
Given that flow across a node is constrained by capacity under probabilistic disruption, 
the expected value of capacity is represented by Eq. (15). 
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𝐸[𝐞𝑘] = {
 𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗) (1 − 𝑢𝑖𝑗(𝐞
𝑘, 𝐡𝑙))     if (𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘 )
𝑚
> 0
 𝑞𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑖𝑗)                                       if (𝑒𝑖𝑗
𝑘)
𝑚
= 0
 (15) 
 
 
2.2.1 Pareto Optimality 
Given the competing objectives, it is necessary to estimate the Pareto set. The exact 
Pareto set 𝐻∗ is defined as the set of all non-dominated defense strategies. Of two 
feasible strategies for reducing vulnerability, 𝐡𝑙 and 𝐡𝑙
′
, given disruption 𝐞𝑘, 𝐡𝑙
′
 
dominates 𝐡𝑙 if 𝐡𝑙
′
outperforms 𝐡𝑙 in at least one objective while 𝐡𝑙
′
 performs at least as 
well as 𝐡𝑙 in the other objectives. If there exists no 𝐡𝑙
′
 that dominates 𝐡𝑙, then 𝐡𝑙 is 
non-dominated and 𝐡𝑙 ∈ 𝐻∗. Specifically for the bi-objective problem discussed here, a 
non-dominated strategy essentially refers to a strategy that improves, say, 𝑧1 relative to 
another strategy but where 𝑧2 degrades relative to the other strategy (and vice versa).  
 
Since 𝐡𝑙 ∈ ℝ+, defining 𝐻∗ precisely, like most multi-objective problems, is at worst, 
impossible, and at best, computationally difficult. This study proposes, instead, that the 
NSGA-II heuristic be used to approximate the Pareto set. 
 
To generate the Pareto-optimal frontier (tradeoff space), a heuristic approach to 
estimating the true Pareto set is favored—namely, the Non-dominated Sorting Genetic 
Algorithm II (NSGA-II)[19]. This algorithm has been shown to perform favorably both 
in terms of accuracy (verified by test sets with known Pareto subsets) and in terms of 
computational complexity for high-dimensional decision spaces in network 
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formulations. Examples of such problems include multi-objective supply chain 
problems[20], supply chain resilience[21], stochastic computer network reliability[22], and 
many other problems based on network and/or graph constructs. 
 
2.3 Robustness Evaluation  
The Pareto set is a set of defense strategies (i.e., an investment in protecting a set of 
links), and each disruption scenario generates one such set. Each set of defense 
strategies is evaluated against all other disruption scenarios in terms of reduction of the 
maximum flow through the network and in terms of commodity demand satisfaction (a 
measure of individual commodity flow). From this set of globally-evaluated solutions, a 
decision maker assesses the performance of each strategy relative to the commodity 
flow performance (𝑧1) for each disruption in 𝐷 and the overall cost (𝑧2) of the defense 
strategy. As the number of disruptions increases, the complexity of the solution set 
increases. To navigate this complexity, this study utilizes a multicriteria decision 
analysis technique, TOPSIS, to define a ranking of candidate solutions, where the 
criteria represent (i) the commodity flow performance for each disruption and (ii) the 
cost of the defense strategy.  
 
The first step of TOPSIS is to ensure that the criteria being compared are 
commensurate. This is typically achieved by normalization (or standardization). Range 
normalization is computationally simple and may offer greater understandability for 
decision makers in the final solution selection stages, although there are other 
normalization techniques that may be more appropriate for different networks[23]. Range 
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normalization is defined on two functional components, one for criteria that are 
perceived as benefits (advantageous) and one for criteria perceived as costs 
(disadvantageous). These are shown in Eqs. (16) and (17), respectively. In both cases, a 
value of one is understood to be the best possible outcome for a given criterion, while a 
value of zero is the worst. 
 
𝑟ℎ𝑙𝑦 =
𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑦 − min
ℎ𝑙∈𝐡𝑙
𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑦
max
ℎ𝑙∈𝐡𝑙
𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑦 − min
ℎ𝑙∈𝐡𝑙
𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑦
 (16) 
 
𝑟ℎ𝑙𝑦 =
max
ℎ𝑙∈𝐡𝑙
𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑦 − 𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑦
max
ℎ𝑙∈𝐡𝑙
𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑦 − min
ℎ𝑙∈𝐡𝑙
𝑥ℎ𝑙𝑦
 (17) 
 
The result is a normalized value, 𝑟ℎ𝑙𝑦, denoting the performance of alternative (i.e., 
defense strategy) ℎ𝑙 for criteria 𝑦 ∈ {1,… , 𝑌}, the set of criteria being considered. A 
weighting scheme can be applied to each criterion, as shown in Eq. (18). 
 
𝑏ℎ𝑙𝑦 = 𝑟ℎ𝑙𝑦𝑤𝑦 (18) 
 
Since the criteria in this study comprise 𝑧1 and 𝑧2 values from Eqs. (9) and (10), the 
best solutions seek minimal values in criteria performance. TOPSIS constructs an ideal 
solution, 𝐴+, componentwise from all considered solutions, selecting the best possible 
criteria outcomes, as shown in Eq. (19). Similarly, an “anti-ideal” solution, 𝐴−, is 
constructed componentwise from all worst criteria outcomes, shown in Eq. (20). 
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𝐴+ = (𝑏1
+, … , 𝑏𝑌
+), 𝑏𝑦
+ = min
𝑦
𝑏ℎ𝑙𝑦 (19) 
 
𝐴− = (𝑏1
−, … , 𝑏𝑌
−), 𝑏𝑦
− = max
𝑦
𝑏ℎ𝑙𝑦 (20) 
 
The solution set is then ordered by comparing each solution to both the ideal and anti-
ideal conditions 𝐴+ and 𝐴−. The solutions are ordered by similarity to the ideal 
condition such that the best solutions have the greatest Euclidean distance from the 
worst condition (𝐷−) and the least distance from the best condition (𝐷+), as described 
in the similarity metric 𝑆+ in Eq. (21). The solutions with higher 𝑆+ values are 
considered to be better solutions. 
 
𝑆+ =
𝐷−
𝐷− + 𝐷+
 (21) 
 
Note that the specific tradeoffs made in the ordering process may lack some 
transparency for high-dimensional situations, but the ease, speed, and relatability of 
TOPSIS suggests that it is reasonable for ordering of robust defense solutions in a 
decision support environment. From the initial solution set, interactive methods for 
determining stakeholder utility can be employed to inform overall decision support, and 
these can be incorporated into the TOPSIS methodology as weights, as noted in Eq. (18) 
above. 
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2.4 Solution Algorithm  
Given that the objective of the modeling process is to understand the impacts of 
disruption across multiple commodities and to provide decision support from that 
understanding, this study proposes the following assimilation of the above formulation 
and techniques. 
 
First, the network is instantiated with nodes, directed links, link capacities for each 
commodity, and the set of disruption scenarios. These disruption scenarios are 
constrained by a resource budget, with resources divided equally among links that are 
targeted. These scenarios must be framed in such a way that the resources directed at 
the links be commensurate with defense strategy resources. Second, the Pareto-optimal 
defense strategies are determined for each disruption scenario using the NSGA-II 
algorithm. These defense strategies are characterized by their objective values: the 
maximum fraction of satisfied demand and overall strategy cost. Third, the performance 
of each defense strategy set is weighed against each disruption scenario to determine 
which defense strategy is most robust across disruptions. The robustness of the defense 
strategies is characterized by an ordering gained from TOPSIS. 
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Chapter 3: Illustrative Example: Swedish Rail Network 
This algorithmic approach was applied to data for a Swedish railway system of 1,363 
stations (nodes) and 1,438 connecting, bidirectional tracks (links), collected from public 
sources and the infrastructure owner[24]. This system has been studied concerning 
infrastructure vulnerability in previous publications[24],[25]. 
 
3.1. Instrumentation 
The data were re-structured and output from Matlab. The problem instance was 
implemented in the Python programming language using the “networkx” package 
(version 1.11)[26] to implement and create graph structures and network data structures, 
the “ecspy” package (version 1.1) to implement evolutionary computations and the 
NSGA-II evolutionary algorithm, and the Python API for the Gurobi solver platform to 
solve the single-objective maximum flow sub-problems. All algorithms were performed 
on a standard laptop computer with a quad-core 2.4GHz processor and 8 gigabytes of 
memory. 
 
3.2. Network Generation 
The freight data comprise 19 different commodities (as shown in Table I) aggregated 
from publicly available data and train operator data. The data contain granularity issues 
in that freight movement was consolidated to the level of cargo routes, whereby specific 
information about individual trains and operators has been removed for sensitivity 
purposes. As a result, the data lack specific supply and demand values for stations and 
capacity parameters for links, though this study makes use of the estimation approach 
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for these parameters from a previous study[27]. Supply and demand values for each 
commodity were distributed across those stations over which train operators shipped 
each commodity, with the values being proportional to the number of routes bearing 
that commodity across that node. Similarly, link capacities were estimated by assessing 
freight movement in the rail network such that the resulting network has some degree of 
slack. Table 1 provides the commodity descriptions (translated from Swedish) and 
estimates for supply and demand. Figure 2 depicts two selected examples of 
capacitation outcomes from this process, showing that different commodities have 
different levels of movement through different paths in the network. Conceptually, this 
could be due to availability of different train car types, or supply-demand interactions. 
 
Given that supply is not equivalent to demand for each commodity, the values are 
adjusted to the minimum of the two values for the base case of this network. In this 
way, the best possible performance of the network equates to 100% demand 
satisfaction. 
 
Generating the network relied heavily on data structures provided by the Python 
package “networkx” [27]. The final network consisted of the original 1,363 nodes and 
2,876 links between them (since each of the original 1,438 links is considered bi-
directional). 
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Table 1. Raw supply and demand data for each commodity (in kilotons). 
Index Commodity Supply Demand 
1 Agriculture, forest, fishing 228 284 
2 Coal, crude oil, natural gas 27 19 
3 Ore 210 262 
4 Food, beverage, tobacco 281 366 
5 Textile, leather 240 262 
6 Wood, cork, pulp, paper 245 276 
7 Petroleum products 198 217 
8 Chemicals, rubber, plastics 186 187 
9 Other non-metallic mineral 270 258 
10 Fabricated metal products 216 193 
11 Machinery and equipment 263 251 
12 Transport equipment 240 269 
13 Furniture, other manufactured 248 239 
14 Return materials and recycling 256 380 
15 Post and packages 0 0 
16 Equipment for transportation 238 260 
17 Moving goods, vehicles for repair 0 0 
18 Loader and grouped goods 287 241 
19 Unidentifiable goods 293 267 
 
  
(a) commodity 2 (b) commodity 7 
Figure 2. Capacitation of the network for commodities 2 (Coal, crude oil, natural 
gas) and 7 (Petroleum products). 
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3.3. Disruption Scenarios 
Since there are no disruption data for this problem instance, and since costs for 
hardening the system are unknown, five separate disruption scenarios were generated. 
For each scenario, 288 links (10% of total) were selected at random and were allocated 
10 units of disruption resource. Lacking a disruption scenario, such a distribution may 
be realistic in the event of a Swedish winter with extremely heavy snowfall combined 
with hard winds. Thus, simulating the probabilities of failure over five disruption 
scenarios should help decision makers to determine the defense strategy (e.g., investing 
in track clearance resources) that is most robust to this problem. An example disruption 
of the network is shown in Figure 3. 
 
   
(a) scenario 1 (b) scenario 2 (c) scenario 3 
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(d) scenario 4 (e) scenario 5  
Figure 3. The five disruption scenarios for the network, with yellow links 
denoting full disruption. 
 
3.4. Pareto Frontier Estimation 
The determination of Pareto frontiers was approached for each disruption scenario 
individually. 
 
To initialize the NSGA-II algorithm, a set of starting solutions is necessary. Each 
solution is a list of defense resources allocated to corresponding links of the network. In 
trial runs and preliminary tuning of the NSGA-II algorithm, different methods were 
used to randomly generate high-performing, sufficiently diverse initial solution sets, but 
it was found that a null set, together with a high mutation rate, performed better than the 
other methods. The set of solutions—or evolutionary “population”—consisted of 50 
members. 
 
Because of the size of the network and the limitations of computational resources, 
parameter tuning was a critical step to ensure high-quality estimates. Given the 50-
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member population, a mutation rate of 0.8 converged to relatively good solutions after 
about 10 generations, so a final value of 20 generations was chosen, pushing the 
computation resources to refine the Pareto estimate as much as possible. Because the 
number of generations is limited, it was found that the combination of a high mutation 
rate with the internal greedy mechanisms of NSGA-II struck a good balance between 
exploration of the solution space and exploitation of superior solutions.  
 
With the problem fully instantiated, the NSGA-II iterations (generations) began. An 
iteration consisted of an application of the contest function to each link for each solution 
in the population given the selected disruption scenario and each solution in the 
population. The outcome of the contest function is a probability value, which was 
assessed with a pseudo-random number generator. As described in Eq. (15), the 
probabilistic outcome is binary, and if the link was found to be “disrupted,” the capacity 
for all commodities on that link was reduced to 0. Likewise, if the outcome of the 
contest function is “not disrupted,” the commodity capacities are unchanged. A new, 
separate, disrupted network is then created for each ℎ𝑙 in the solution set, and the 
minimal value of the greatest fraction of unsatisfied demand (𝑧1) is calculated through 
solving a multiple-commodity network flow problem (for each ℎ𝑙) implemented in the 
Python API for the Gurobi linear programming platform. The fitness of each solution in 
the population was determined from the 𝑧1 value and the cost of the solution, taken to 
be the sum of the defense resources allocated to each link (𝑧2). 
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NSGA-II was then allowed to iterate for 20 generations using blend crossovers and the 
canonical NSGA-II selection and diversity methods to produce an estimate of the Pareto 
set of best-performing defense strategies. 
 
3.5. Robustness Evaluation and Strategy Ranking 
The final solution set obtained from each disruption scenario was then assessed for 
performance in each of the other five disruption scenarios. This resulted in a final 
solution set with a total of 250 solutions (population size multiplied by number of 
disruptions). Each of these solutions generated a disrupted graph instance for each of 
the five disruptions, and the resulting 1,250 graphs were assessed for 𝑧1, while 𝑧2 was 
constant across each of the 250 solutions. 
Six criteria were considered: the𝑧1 outcome from each of the five disruption scenarios 
and overall cost, 𝑧2.  for the TOPSIS ranking. The top-ranked of the 250 defense 
strategies are provided in Table 2. 
 
Table 2. TOPSIS rankings for top 12 defense strategies. 
Defense 
population 
Population 
member S+ Rank 
Vulnerability 𝑧1 for scenario 𝑘 Cost 
𝑧2 𝑘 = 1 𝑘 = 2 𝑘 = 3 𝑘 = 4 𝑘 = 5 
1 0 0.462 1 0.099 0.400 0.494 0.619 0.665 14294 
1 2 0.459 2 0.238 0.412 0.549 0.627 0.666 13943 
1 3 0.443 3 0.257 0.427 0.559 0.665 0.673 13927 
1 1 0.419 4 0.213 0.409 0.549 0.627 0.665 14286 
1 7 0.415 5 0.323 0.452 0.580 0.665 0.677 13944 
1 5 0.404 6 0.276 0.445 0.579 0.665 0.673 14110 
1 6 0.401 7 0.323 0.449 0.579 0.665 0.677 14038 
1 12 0.390 8 0.361 0.469 0.586 0.665 0.712 13980 
4 3 0.387 9 0.716 0.716 0.716 0.273 0.716 13773 
1 11 0.387 10 0.355 0.469 0.586 0.665 0.712 14009 
3 2 0.383 11 0.716 0.716 0.198 0.716 0.716 13938 
1 17 0.382 12 0.361 0.474 0.591 0.665 0.716 14018 
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Mentioned previously, running NSGA-II for each disruption scenario generated 50 
Pareto-optimal solutions (250 total). Between the crossover operator and the mutation 
operator used in the genetic iterations of NSGA-II, most solutions allocated defense 
resources to links that were not disrupted in the scenario. This was initially unexpected, 
but in the scheme of multiple disruptions, distributing resources with a broader brush 
conferred some degree of robustness to the solution sets, as the distribution of resources 
was appreciably uniform for non-disrupted links. This robustness creates inefficiency in 
solution costs and overall costs are inflated compared to parsimonious distribution of 
defense resources only to those links in the disruption set. It is expected, however, that 
longer run-times of NSGA-II over more disruption scenarios would improve the Pareto 
estimation and reduce this artificial inflation, confining resource allocation to the most 
vulnerable links.  
 
Despite these inefficacies, the quality of the solution set in a decision support 
environment remains high. Given the real-world political and socio-economic 
complexities of implementing defense strategies, a number of defense strategies with 
similar performance and costs but different allocations of resources might be desired. 
Perhaps, in the above example, resource allocation is limited in certain regions because 
of logistics, legislated spending caps, or some other difficult-to-model reality. 
Moreover, defense strategies that augment all links to some extent and critical links to a 
greater extent are defensibly realistic for certain probabilistic disruption scenarios. For 
example, those implementations, depending on the system of interest, might manifest as 
railway bridge retrofitting for spring floods, sandbagging flooding rivers, or adding 
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parallel tracks. In a decision support environment, a decision maker may appreciate 
alternatives that, although not Pareto-optimal by definition, still confer non-trivial 
vulnerability reduction and overall increased system resilience. Further, TOPSIS offers 
a fast, transparent, easily-understandable ordering of these solutions. The distance-
driven approach helps identify the superior solutions regardless of the quality of Pareto-
optimality estimation from the NSGA-II output. 
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Chapter 4: Concluding Remarks 
This study offers a formulation and modeling approach to assessing a multiple-
commodity system's vulnerability to disruption events. The system is abstracted to a 
graph representation of a network of nodes and directed, capacitated links. The network 
formulation aims to reduce the cost of a defense strategy while maintaining a high 
degree of demand satisfaction for each commodity. These objectives are based on the 
decision to allocate defense resources to specific links in the network. A heuristic search 
by a well-established genetic algorithm estimates the Pareto frontier for each disruption 
scenario in the set of disruption events. These Pareto frontiers form the solution set and 
are incorporated into a decision support environment with TOPSIS. From TOPSIS, the 
criteria of each solution (i.e., total cost and, for each disruption, demand satisfaction) 
are compared to an ideal condition and the solutions are ordered in terms of robustness 
of each defense strategy to all possible disruptions. The solution method allows for 
some decision maker interaction to account for real-world difficulties of implementing 
specific defense strategies (e.g., weight given to disruptions assumed to be more likely 
or of bigger concern).  
 
4.1. Limitations 
This approach has potential to be useful in several ways, but the consideration of a 
solution’s response to each disruption after the heuristic estimation limits its ability to 
be robust to the other disruptions. This could be avoided by adding a demand 
satisfaction objective for each disruption (like 𝑧1), but it is anticipated that this would 
prohibitively increase computation time for this problem instance and implementation 
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given NSGA-II’s computational complexity and the data structures employed in the 
algorithm. 
 
Another issue was that the network is fairly sparse. The sparsity of the underlying graph 
causes significant problems when assessing impacts of the disruption strategy we chose. 
It was found that if a disruption occurred on a sparse branch or subgraph then the 
solution quality would be highly dependent on the randomness of NSGA-II variator 
operator to “find” that branch. That is, if no solutions evolved to address the disruption 
of the link in that sparse subgraph, then the solution would not mitigate the disruption of 
that link. As a result, the demand satisfaction objective (𝑧1) would suffer and appear 
“frozen” for a given disruption across multiple population members. This can be seen in 
Table II where the 𝑧1 objective value for a disruption is the same for multiple solutions. 
Sparsity of the network has similar consequences for the robustness evaluation across 
the different disruptions, as seen in the dominance of disruption scenario 1 in Table 2. It 
was found that the particular disruptions generated in disruption scenarios 2 through 5 
had several disrupted links in sparse subgraphs. Again, the exploration mechanics of 
NSGA-II had difficulty “finding” these links in order to allocate defense resources to 
them. Disruption scenario 1 had fewer disruptions on sparse subgraphs. The result is the 
coincidental dominance of defense strategy 1 (which was generated from disruption 
scenario 1). To overcome issues associated with sparsity, it may be useful to employ 
graph-reducing algorithms. This might cause difficulties with capacitation, so any such 
reduction or simplification of the graph will need to account for bottlenecking of 
capacity along a sparse subgraph after disruption. That is, reducing sparsity in the graph 
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is secondary to retaining integrity of the disruptive event and defensive strategy; over-
simplification may reduce the effective meaning of a given solution. 
 
A further limitation is that this model assumes deterministic supply and demand values, 
and that supply and demand should be equivalent. Given the model’s high complexity 
under assumptions of determinism, incorporating stochasticity may make the model 
prohibitively complex to solve in realistic time. 
 
Finally, the complexity of the data structures and the slightly long solution times (tens 
of hours) may limit the applicability of this approach to larger or more time-sensitive 
problems, though it is argued that this approach should be used for longer term planning 
where run time is not likely an issue. As discussed above, simplification of the network 
may avoid these computational disadvantages, but would require careful thought for 
each specific problem instantiation. 
 
Despite these limitations, the proposed approach offers robust solutions in a decision 
support environment to begin addressing network vulnerability to a certain kind of 
disruption. Importantly, no single outcome from the TOPSIS ranking should be treated 
as a superior solution, but rather as a starting point to approach real-world complexities 
associated with the system. Note that TOPSIS is just one of several techniques that 
could be chosen to compare discrete strategies under multiple criteria. TOPSIS was 
chosen here due to its simplicity and its ability to implement a compromise solution. 
27 
The choice of decision analysis technique could influence the ranking of strategies[28], 
though a comparison is not sought here. 
 
4.2. Future Work 
Future work may entail performing a computational performance analysis for several 
types of networks across different evolutionary heuristics. That is, NSGA-II may be 
superior in some regards, but more recent heuristics may be better-suited to dealing with 
complex data structures that often arise in network modeling with multiple 
commodities. Along these lines, network simplification and sparsity-reducing 
algorithms might be explored to reduce the number of non-contributing nodes and links 
of a real-world network. Eliminating even a few nodes and/or links could significantly 
reduce computation times and encourage the use of more evolutionary generations to 
explore and exploit useful defense solution attributes. 
 
Within the resilience modeling framework, future research will elucidate trade-offs 
between vulnerability reduction and recoverability improvement given disruptions with 
some stochastic component (e.g., trade-off between pre-disruption and post-disruption 
investments).  
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